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Abstract
This study aims to propose a discussion on vote value dis-
parity and judicial review in Japan. The starting point of 
this analysis is the 2015 ruling by the Japanese Supreme 
Court on the disparity in the number of members in the 
House of Representatives following the general elections 
of December 2014. According to the Japanese Constitu-
tion, the value of the votes should be equal to the total 
number of voters. It was requested to the Supreme Court 
that the results of the 2014 elections for the House of 
Representatives were considered null and void. The ar-
ticle analyses the current Diet, the Japanese electoral 
system, the Japanese judicial review and the relation be-
tween representatives and voters. Then, it focuses on Ik-
en-Jotai doctrine on “unconstitutional state or condition”, 
about the irregularities with the process, as well as the 
2015 reform and the Supreme Court’s decision. It con-
cludes, amongst other things, that the analyzed decision 
used the political question theory, and that the autono-
my and discretion of the cabinet should have been con-
sidered. The methodology of the study is bibliographic 
and jurisprudential analysis on the theme. 
Keywords: vote value disparity; judicial review; Japanese 
election; Iken-Jotai doctrine; Japanese Supreme Court. 
Resumo
Este estudo tem como objetivo propor uma discussão sobre 
a disparidade do valor do voto e a revisão judicial no Japão. 
O ponto de partida desta análise é a decisão de 2015 do Su-
premo Tribunal japonês sobre a disparidade no número de 
membros na Câmara dos Representantes após as eleições 
gerais de dezembro de 2014. De acordo com a Constituição 
japonesa, o valor dos votos deve ser igual ao número total 
de eleitores. A Suprema Corte japonesa foi demandada 
para que os resultados das eleições de 2014 para a Câmara 
dos Representantes fossem considerados nulos e sem efeito. 
O artigo analisa o atual regime, o sistema eleitoral japonês, 
a revisão judicial japonesa e a relação entre representantes 
e eleitores. Em seguida, enfoca a doutrina Iken-Jotai sobre 
“estado ou condição inconstitucional”, sobre as irregulari-
dades com o processo, bem como sobre a reforma de 2015 
e a decisão da Suprema Corte. Conclui, entre outras coisas, 
que a decisão analisada utilizou a teoria das questões polí-
ticas e que a autonomia e discrição do gabinete deveriam 
ter sido consideradas. A metodologia do estudo é a análise 
bibliográfica e jurisprudencial sobre o tema.
Palavras-chave: disparidade de valor de voto; revisão ju-
dicial; eleição japonesa; doutrina Iken-Jotai; Suprema Corte 
do Japão.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that there was disparity 
in the number of members in the House of Representatives following the general elec-
tions of December 2014. The plaintiff argued that the results of the 2014 elections for 
the House of Representatives were null and void. The value of the votes should be equal 
to the total number of voters, according to Articles 14 and 44 of the Japanese Constitu-
tion. The vote value disparity has created controversy through several cases since the 
Japanese Constitution was established.
The Japanese Supreme Court has repeatedly used a rather obscure doctrine 
called Iken-Jotai, or an “unconstitutional state or condition,” which explains that, althou-
gh an election is effective, it is nevertheless an illegal and unconstitutional process at 
the time of election as per the equality before the law doctrine of Articles 14 and 44 
of the Japanese Constitution. This unconstitutional status prevents disorder in case all 
members of the Diet lose their eligibility by judicial decision. The doctrine urges the 
Diet to reform the allocation of the number of members in the constituency, without 
stipulating a specific period of time in which to do so. A message of caution from the 
Japanese Supreme Court might not be heeded by the Diet, as it is a dysfunctional bran-
ch of government.
In Japan, constituency reform is overseen by members of the parliament. An 
electoral district-fixing council is established in the parliament after judicial decisions, 
and the majority of the ruling party may modify its council advice. An electoral system 
with the single-seat constituency system of the House of Representatives was introdu-
ced by the Diet in 1994. This system is advantageous to sitting members of the ruling 
party. The elimination of seats in its electoral district by reform means that members of 
the Diet lose the support of groups in their district.
A parliamentary system of government was adopted into the Japanese Cons-
titution in 1947, which was strongly influenced by the Allied Powers. Although the 
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Constitution does not state that the prime minister can dissolve the House of Repre-
sentatives, this occurred in a landmark precedent, the Tomabechi case in 1960. Consti-
tutional scholars argue that in some cases, the House of Representatives was dissolved 
without solving pertinent political issues for the Japanese people. The Tomabechi case 
requires further research by Japanese Constitutional law scholars.
The Japanese Supreme Court might have adopted a different judicial review 
system in cases of election of the Diet. Japanese judicial review requires disputes on 
matters of law to be brought to court. The Public Officer Election Act provides excep-
tions that allow voters to argue that an election is null and void. Recently, some lower 
courts have changed their approach to voting on value disparity cases, and have held 
these cases to be unconstitutional without using the unconstitutional state doctrine. 
The Supreme Court might change in the future as a result of discussions among Japa-
nese constitutional law scholars. 
The purpose of this paper is to initiate domestic discussion among Japane-
se constitutional law scholars regarding vote value disparity and judicial review in 
Japan.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING PERIOD AND ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE CURRENT DIET 
2.1.  The amendment of the Meiji Constitution
The Japanese Constitution was amended from the Meiji Constitution, the Cons-
titution of the Empire of Japan. Accepting the Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26, 
1945, or the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, the Meiji govern-
ment surrendered and was subjected to the will of the General Headquarters (GHQ). 
The General of the United States army, MacArthur Douglas, was the Supreme Comman-
der for the Allied Powers. 
MacArthur ordered the Joji Matsumoto Committee to draft the new Constitu-
tion. On February 1, 1945, the Mainichi newspaper published its draft, which surprised 
MacArthur, as it still remained a conventional constitution with only minor changes. 
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MacArthur thus ordered the drafting of a new constitution with three princi-
ples1 and established a task force on February 3, 1946.2 The GHQ submitted the draft 
of the new constitution. Just before February 8, 1946, the Matsumoto Committee sub-
mitted his draft to the GHQ, called the Tentative Revision of the Constitution, with his 
supplementary explanations.3
Matsumoto prepared two types of drafts. The submitted draft provided that the 
Emperor was the head of the state, and could dissolve the House of Representatives. 
The Emperor was prohibited from dissolving the House of Representatives twice on the 
same grounds. Furthermore, the draft proposed two houses for the Diet.
The Matsumoto Committee draft was rejected on February 13, 1945, and the 
GHQ showed its draft to the Japanese government. The Japanese government and the 
GHQ worked together to amend the draft from February 27 to April 17 as the Draft for 
a Revised Constitution. 
MacArthur’s draft on February 12 provided that the Emperor was a symbol of 
the Japanese people, and “[T]he Diet shall consist of one house of elected representati-
ves with a membership of not less than 300, nor more than 500.”4
The current Japanese Constitution outlines two houses in its parliament, or the 
Diet, as it’s called in Japan: the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.5 
The main result of MacArthur’s draft was the abolishment of the Emperor’s sovereign-
1  TSUJI, Yuichiro. Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining Its Likeness to American and Ger-
man Courts. Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics, Tsukuba, vol. 68, p. 35-78, oct. 2016. The origin and history 
of the Japanese Constitution in English. Birth of the Constitution of Japan [English]. < http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/index.html >. (last visited on February 26, 2016). HALEY, John. The Spirit Of Japanese Law. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006. RAMSEYER, Mark; RASMUSEN, Eric. Measuring Judicial Indepen-
dence: the political economy of judging in Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. p. 21. Ramseyer 
showed LDP control over the General Secretary of the Supreme Court in malapportionment cases before judi-
cial reform in 1990s. TANAKA, Hideo. A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946. In: TANAKA, Hideo; SMITH, 
Malcolm (Eds.). The Japanese Legal System. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976. p. 653.  BEER, Lawrence. 
Peace in Theory and Practice under Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. Marquette Law Review, Milwaukee, vol. 
81, n. 3, p. 815-830, mar./may1998.
2  I. The Emperor is the head of the State and his succession is dynastic. His duties and powers will be ex-
ercised in accordance with the constitution and he is responsible to the basic will of the people as provided 
therein.
 II. War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling 
its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals that are now stirring the 
world for its defense and its protection. No Japanese army, navy, or air force will ever be authorized and no 
right to the belligerence will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. III. The feudal system of Japan will 
cease. No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial Family will extend beyond the limits of those now 
existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody within itself any national or civic power of 
government. The budget will be modeled after the British system.
3  Prof. Toshiyoshi Miyazawa at Tokyo University helped Matsumoto with the constitutional draft. 
4  TSUJI, Yuichiro. Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining Its Likeness to American and Ger-
man Courts. Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics, Tsukuba, vol. 68, p. 35-78, oct. 2016.
5  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.42. The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the 
House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.
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ty and the House of Peers. The Japanese government proposed the idea of a bicameral 
legislature. However, the GHQ objected to two houses since Japan did not have a fe-
deral system, stating “disputes would arise over the weight of authority between the 
two houses.”6 Nevertheless, the Japanese persuaded the GHQ, and two houses were 
established in the Draft for a Revised Constitution (March 6 draft) in 1946. The House 
of Councillors was created to mitigate the decision-making power of the lower hou-
se. However, clear divisions and differences between the House of Councillors and the 
lower house were not clearly stipulated in the Japanese Constitution.7
2.2.  General elections under the Meiji Constitution and the current 
Diet
Voting rights were granted to men in 1925 under the Meiji Constitution; wo-
men’s suffrage was provided by the revised House of Representatives Election Law 
and a general election was held on April 10, 1946. Imperial parliament under the Meiji 
Constitution was opened on May 16, 1946. Thus, this election had implications for the 
drafting of the new Japanese Constitution.
The Imperial Parliament deliberated the draft of the Japanese Constitution. 
It passed the House of Representatives and the House of Peers. During this plenary 
session, a small committee made several modifications. This Constitution adopted the 
three principles suggested by MacArthur. The Japanese Constitution was promulgated 
on November 3, 1946, and came into force on May 3, 1947.
The Japanese government submitted two drafts on March 2 and March 5 in 
1946, both of which named the Emperor as the symbol of the nation, and proposed 
two Houses in the Diet.8
6  TSUJI, Yuichiro. Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining Its Likeness to American and Ger-
man Courts. Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics, Tsukuba, vol. 68, p. 35-78, oct. 2016. See also, The origin and 
history of the Japanese Constitution. Birth of the Constitution of Japan [English]. <http://www.ndl.go.jp/con-
stitution/e/index.html>. (Last visited on 26 March, 2016). “Milo E. Rowell, Judicial Affairs Officer in Government 
Section, GHQ, indicated in “Report of preliminary studies and recommendations of the Japanese Constitution.” 
The comment of [Report of preliminary studies and recommendations of the Japanese Constitution] that ei-
ther a unicameral or bicameral legislature would be acceptable, as long as all the legislators were elected. On 
top of that, the U.S. Government also recommended that the legislative body be fully representative of the 
electorate in Reform of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC 228). The comment of [Reform of the 
Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC 228) comment], sent to MacArthur for his “information.”
7  KATO, Kazuhiko. Sangi-in no Isikika sareta Genzo Keisei. Tokyo Keizai Law Review, Tokyo, vol. 30, p. 199-?, 
2016.
8  Some private drafts written for the Japanese Constitution suggested a presidential system and the abolish-
ment of the Emperor, such as that written by the leader of the Constitution Investigation Association, Iwasabu-
ro Takano. Takano wrote his own draft of the Constitution in which he proposed a presidential system with two 
Houses in the Diet and the elimination of the Emperor system. At that time, the abolishment of Emperor was a 
very sensitive issue. 
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Article 43(2) of the Japanese Constitution states “[B]oth Houses shall consist of 
elected members, representative of all the people. The number of the members of each 
House shall be fixed by law.” The number of both Houses was established in the Public 
Officer Election Act [Koushoku Senkyo Hou]. Article 4 of the Public Officer Election Act9 
stated that the total number of seats in the House of Representatives was 475, and that 
of the House of Councillors was 242.10 
Article 45 of the Japanese Constitution11 states that the term of office for the 
House of Representatives is 4 years, and 6 years for the House of Councillors. Article 4612 
of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that an election for half the members shall take 
place once every three years. The Public Officer Election Act was amended in 2015, and 
the suffrage age was changed to 18 years old beginning from the July, 2016 election for 
the House of Councillors.13 Article 10 of the Public Officer Election Act provides that a 
person of 25 years of age or older may run as a candidate to become a member of the 
House of Representatives, and 30 years of age or older for the House of Councillors.14 
The reason for a 5-year difference between the two Houses is not clearly stated in the 
Japanese Constitution, nor is the unique function of the House of Councillors. 
3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM
3.1.  The Tomabechi case and the House of Representatives
The House of Representatives adopted an electoral system comprised of sin-
gle-seat constituencies and proportionally represented, multiple-seat constituencies 
(Shou Senkyoku Hirei Daihyou Heiritsu).15 A total of 290 members were selected from 
single-seat constituencies as of 2016.16 The voter states one candidate’s name on the 
ballot paper at the polling place for a single-seat constituency (Shou Senkyoku). The 
remaining 180 members are selected from proportionally represented, multiple-seat 
constituencies (Hireidaihyou).17 Japan is divided into 11 districts, and voters state the 
9  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.4. (Japan).
10  See id. Art. 4.
11  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.45. The term of office of members of the House of Rep-
resentatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the 
House of Representatives is dissolved.
12  Id. Art. 46. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for half 
the members shall take place every three years.
13  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.9 (Japan).
14  See id. Art. 10.
15  Id. Art. 12.
16  Id. Art. 12, 13, Appendix 2.
17  Id. Art. 13 (2), Appendix 2.
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name of a political party on the ballot paper. The list is submitted by the political party 
beforehand, and this decides the elected representatives from the top name of the list 
(Kousoku).
In the allocation of parliamentary seats in a proportional representation system, 
the d’Hondt formula was used.18
 The House of Representatives may be dissolved by a non-confidence resolution 
against the cabinet under Article 6919 of the Japanese Constitution. The Japanese Cons-
titution has a parliamentary system. Although the core of the parliamentary system 
is not clear,20 the cabinet and legislature are expected to work together.21 The cabinet 
stands on the confidence of the legislature. Article 69 of the Constitution stipulates 
that the House of Representatives must pass a non-confidence resolution, or reject a 
confidence resolution; the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Represen-
tatives is dissolved within 10 days. In the case of dissolution, all members of the House 
of Representatives lose their office and must run for the next general election.
 Impliedly, Article 722 of the Japanese Constitution has been used by the cabi-
net to dissolve the House of Representatives. Chapter I of the Japanese Constitution 
outlines the role of the Emperor. Under the Japanese Constitution, sovereignty belongs 
to the people of Japan, not the Emperor. The Emperor’s role is ritual and formal without 
any political authority. Each paragraph of Article 7 provides that the Emperor acts in 
matters of the state on behalf of the people. These acts shall be performed with the 
advice and approval of the cabinet.23
 Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Constitution deals with the dissolution of the 
House of Representatives. The cabinet has used this Article to dissolve the House of Re-
presentatives even in cases without a non-confidence resolution. Under the Japanese 
parliamentary system, the prime minister is also usually the head of the political party 
that has the majority of seats in the Diet.24 The Japanese prime minister is selected from 
18  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art. 95(2) (Japan).
19  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.69. If the House of Representatives passes a non-con-
fidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of 
Representatives is dissolved within 10 days.
20  One position understands that in the parliamentary system, the cabinet and the parliament oppose each 
other equally. The other position understands that the cabinet stands on the trust of the parliament, and both 
work together. This difference in positions on the parliamentary system would lead the cabinet’s power to 
dissolve the House of Representatives.
Kazuiki Takahashi, Kokumin Naikaku sei Sairon [Nation Cabinet again, vol.2] 1137 Jurist 93-95 (1998).
21  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 476. 
22  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.7(3). The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the 
Cabinet, shall perform the following act in matters of state on behalf of the people: dissolution of the House of 
Representatives.
23  Id.
24  In Japanese political history, the prime minister was selected from the coalition parties. In this case, the 
prime minister was not head of the party that occupied the majority in the House of Representatives.
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the members of each House of the Diet, according to Article 6725 of the Constitution. 
However, according to convention, the prime minister has usually been selected from 
the House of Representatives, not the Councillors, as the House of Representatives is 
more popular among voters, as it can be dissolved and the term of office is shorter.26
Interpretation of Article 7 on dissolution is based on the well-known Tomabechi 
case. The third Shigeru Yoshida cabinet dissolved the House of Representatives using 
Article 7 in August, 1952. Concluding the San Francisco Treaty27 in 1951, the occupation 
of the GHQ was completed. Those who were exiled from public offices by the GHQ 
returned to the government. One of those exiled was Ichiro Hatoyama, a political rival 
of Yoshida in the Liberal Party,28 who demanded the resignation of Shigeru Yoshida’s 
cabinet.29 Yoshida dissolved the Cabinet on August 28, 1952; this decision was secretly 
decided by a small group, who aimed to prepare for the election in order to oppose 
Hatoyama. This is called a surprising unannounced dissolution (Nukiuchi Kaisan). 
Gizo Tomabechi, a member of the House of Representatives and of the National 
Democratic Party, lost seats in this election.30 He took legal action arguing that the dis-
solution based on Article 7 was null and void without Article 69. The Supreme Court31 
denied Tomabechi’s appeal.32 It held that its dissolution was too political and outside 
the jurisdiction of the judiciary. This is called a political question theory in Japan (Touchi 
Koui ). The three opinions explained that the judiciary could review the dissolution, and 
in 1952, the dissolution became legal and effective.
Justice Katsushige Kotani, joined by Kenichi Okuno, believed that the dissolu-
tion was under judicial review. Dissolution by Article 7 was a political action that was 
transformed by cabinet advice and approval into ritual conduct of the Emperor. The 
district court approved the advice and approval of the cabinet; thus, the dissolution 
was constitutionally effective.
25  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.67. The prime minister shall be designated from among 
the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business.
26  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 180.
27  Treaty of Peace with Japan (Sept. 8, 1951).
28  The Liberal Democratic Party in Japan was formed in 1955. 
29  Yoshida and Hatoyama promised that Yoshida would hand over leadership of the Liberal Party to Hatoya-
ma in 1946 when he was purged by the GHQ.
30  Tomabechi was a member of the group that went to sign the San Francisco Treaty in 1951. It took effect in 
1952. Article 7 dissolution was 
31  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] June 8, 1960, Showa 30(0) no.96, 14(7) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 
1206 (Japan).
32  The Tokyo district court held that dissolution without advice and consent of the cabinet was unconstitu-
tionally null and void. Tokyo Chiho Saibansho [Tokyo Dist.Ct.] October 19, 1953, Showa 27 (Gyou) no. 156, 14(7) 
Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1251 (Japan). The Tokyo high court held that the cabinet advised 
the dissolution, which was constitutional. Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] September 22, 1954, Showa 
28 (ne) no. 2010. 14(7) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 1265 (Japan).
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Justice Daisuke Kawamura noted that an intrinsic limitation of the judiciary 
theory was against Article 8133 of the Constitution. The judiciary’s mission is to protect 
people’s rights, and should not refrain from judicial review in the name of abstaining 
or for overly political concerns. In this case, Article 7 granted the cabinet the power to 
dissolve the House of Representatives. The advice and approval provided in Article 7 is 
indistinguishable. In this case, the advice and approval was legal and effective. 
Justice Shuichi Ishida noted two issues in this case. One was that the cabinet 
could dissolve the Diet, which was outside of the judiciary’s jurisdiction. The other was 
the advice and approval of the cabinet, which was under judicial review. 
There are several differences between the cases of Tomabechi and Sunagawa,34 
the latter of which occurred 6 months before Tomabechi. Sunagawa used the political 
question theory for the defense and security treaty35 concluded between Japan and the 
United States in September 1951.36
First, the Tomabechi case’s justification for the Article 7 dissolution relied on le-
gislative discretion. Second, the words “clearly obvious unconstitutionality or invalidity” 
in Sunagawa were not used in Tomabechi.37 It is not clear what factors were used to 
determine something to be an example of “clearly obvious unconstitutionality or inva-
lidity”. Thus, the political question theory might not be required in Tomabechi, for the 
judiciary to review the dissolution by the cabinet.
Second, the political question doctrine in the Tomabechi case was doubtful. The 
Supreme Court could have used the autonomy and discretion of the cabinet decision 
because the political question doctrine is not provided in text of the Japanese Consti-
tution. It is based on the people’s intrinsic sovereignty, but its scope should be clearly 
limited.38
33  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.81.The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with 
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act.
34  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] Dec. 16, 1959, Showa 34(a) no.710, 13 Saiko Saibansho Keiji Hanreishu [Keishu] 
3225.
35  Kyu Nihonkoku to Amerika Gasshukoku to no aidano anzen hoshou jouyaku [The old security treaty be-
tween Japan and the United States], Japan-U.S., 28 April 1952, Treaty no. 6, 1952.
36  TSUJI, Yuichiro. Constitutional Court in Japan. Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics, Tsukuba, vol. 66, p. 
65-87, mar. 2016. p. 84. See also, KAMATA, Taisuke. Adjudication and the Governing Process; Political Questions 
and Legislative Discretion. In: LUNEY, Percy; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki (Eds.). Japanese Constitutional Law. Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press 1993. p. 156-157.
37  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 280. SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 641.
38  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 18. ASHIBE, Nobuyoshi. Kenpo [Constitution]. 6. ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2015. This book is still being edited by Prof. Kazuyuki Takahashi after Prof. Ashibe passed away.
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Nobuyoshi Ashibe noted several conditions for dissolution by the cabinet.39 
First, an important bill submitted by the cabinet is not passed in parliament, or the 
cabinet shelves the bill. Second, the fundamental nature of the cabinet is changed by 
political realignment. Third, there is a need to deal with new important issues that have 
not arisen in the general elections. Fourth, the cabinet changes its fundamental policy 
drastically. Fifth, the term of the members of the House of Representatives is nearly 
complete, in which case arbitrary dissolution is prohibited.40
Koji Sato believes that acts based on Article 7 are political, which are transfor-
med into ritual through cabinet decision. He agreed with Ashibe that arbitrary dis-
solution by the cabinet should be limited, and the question of whether dissolution 
based on Article 7 is justified depends on the cabinet decision.41 Both agree that the 
constituent body should review its dissolution by voting under the name of the pe-
ople’s sovereignty.
3.2.  Reform of the House of Representatives
In 1984, the elections to the House of Representatives used to be based on an 
electoral district system called a “medium” electoral district system (Chu Senkyo Ku), be-
ginning in the Meiji Constitution period. The name “medium” was used in Japan, but 
it is the major constituency system that chooses three to five representatives in one 
constituency. The constituency was fixed by the size of the population and the geogra-
phical size in the Meiji Constitution period. The first general election in 1947 utilized the 
major constituency system, the medium electoral district system for the new Japanese 
Constitution.
The allocation of members was based on the population at that time. The Public 
Officer Election Act provided that the allocation would be looked over by the national 
census every 5 years.42 The allocation system was not overhauled; however, partial ad-
justments were made several times.
In 1994, the medium electoral district system was changed to an electoral sys-
tem comprised of single-seat constituencies (Shou Senkyoku) and proportionally repre-
sented, multiple-seat constituencies (Hirei Daihyo). The election in 1996 introduced the 
current system.43
39  ASHIBE, Nobuyoshi. Kenpo [Constitution]. 6. ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015. p. 335. Sato thinks it is 
problematic that the cabinet decision is beyond judicial review.  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Sei-
bundo, 2011 p. 497.
40  TSUJI, Yuichiro. Amendment of the Japanese Constitution – A Comparative Law Approach. Nanzan Review 
of American Studies, Aichi, vol. 37, p. 51-70, 2015.
41  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011 p. 452, 477, 503, 519.
42  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art. 203, 204 (Japan).
43  MATSUI, Shigenori. Kenpo [Constitution of Japan]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2007.
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The Japanese Constitution has not provided clear details outlining the electo-
ral districts and methods for election. Article 1444 of the Constitution provides equal 
protection under the law, and Article 4445 prohibits discrimination based on race, cre-
ed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property, or income in order to quali-
fy as a member of both Houses and their electors. Japanese Constitutional scholars 
believe that the one vote per person principle and equality are requirements of the 
Constitution.46
The district-fixing council47 (Senkyo Kukaku Shingi Iinnkai) for the House of Re-
presentatives was established under the cabinet office. The seven members are chosen 
from among experts, and their job is to advise the prime minister. Based on this advice, 
the government may submit a bill to parliament to amend the Public Officer Election 
Act, based on Article 7248 of the Constitution.
The district-fixing council is not included in the Constitution, and its opinion is 
advisory with no binding power; that is to say that its advice does not bind the cabinet. 
The council’s autonomy to fix the electoral districts might be constitutionally required 
if the judiciary declares that voting disparity has been unequal under unconstitutional 
conditions or states (Iken-Joutai).49 The Supreme Court may reflect the council’s impor-
tance in writing its Iken-Jotai decisions.
The choice of this electoral system contains both advantages and disadvanta-
ges. In constitutional law studies in Japan, this issue is reviewed in terms of the rela-
tionship between voters and representatives. This issue is reviewed in Chapter III.
44  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.14. All of the people are equal under the law and there 
shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or 
family origin.
45  See id. Art. 44. The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. Howev-
er, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property, 
or income.
46  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 18-. See also, ASHIBE, Nobuyoshi. Kenpo [Constitution]. 6. ed. Tokyo: Iwana-
mi Shoten, 2015. p. 42.
47  Shugin Giin Senkyoku Kakutei Shingikai Sechi Hou [The Act for electoral district-fixing committee for the 
House of Representatives], Law No. 95 of 2012 (Japan).
48  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.72. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, sub-
mits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet, and exercises control and super-
vision over various administrative branches.
49  TOMATSU, Hidenori. Equal Protection of the Law. In: LUNEY, Percy; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki (Eds.). Japanese 
Constitutional Law. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993. p. 195. Tomatsu translated Iken Joutai to circum-
stances decision. HALEY, John. The Spirit Of Japanese Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006. p. 182. 
John Haley argues that “ the Japanese judiciary may seem in these cases weak and impotent”.
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3.3.  The purpose of the House of Councilors
The bicameral system in Japan means that the two Houses of the Diet manage 
their business independently and equally. During the drafting of the Japanese Cons-
titution, the Japanese government explained to the GHQ that an upper House would 
prevent arbitrary parliamentary decision-making by the lower House, and “a change 
in government to a unicameral system might pose the threat of radical shifts in go-
vernment policy, and a bicameral system would promote stability and continuity in 
government policies.”50 Japanese Constitutional law scholars explain further that the 
House of Councillors prevents hasty decision-making by the House of Representati-
ves, and mitigates collision between the House of Representatives and the cabinet. 
By using two different voting systems in two Houses, various opinions are reflected 
in parliament. However, as the power of political party was strong, the House of Cou-
ncillors has been criticized as being a copy of the House of Representatives, with no 
unique function.
When the two Houses collided in four cases, the decision of the House of Re-
presentatives was deemed superior to that of the House of Councillors, in matters rela-
ted to bills, treaties, budgeting, and the nomination of the prime minister. The purpose 
of these specific conditions in the Japanese Constitution is to promote the decision
-making power of the Diet. In addition, the House of Representatives is closer to the 
voters, and a stable and strong cabinet is maintained. 
 The House of Councillors does not have a “general” election, in that only half 
of the members are selected every 3 years. Thus, 121 councilors are selected every 3 
years. Out of 242 members, 96 members are selected through proportional representa-
tion, which covers all territories in Japan. On ballot papers, voters state the name of the 
candidate, or the name of the political party. The election system, called the Electoral 
District System (Senkyoku-Senkyo), selects the remaining 146 members (73 seats every 
3 years) of the House of Councillors. Unlike the proportionally representative election of 
the House of Representatives, the fixed list of candidate names is not prepared by the 
political party. It is called Hi-Kousoku Meibo in Japanese. In the proportionally represen-
tative election (Hirei Daihyo),51 96 seats (48 seats every 3 years) are given, and voters can 
choose to write the name of the candidate or the political party. Two routes are used to 
decide the chosen representatives.
First, the political party obtains votes with the name of the party and the name 
of party’s candidate. Then, the number of the seats the party acquires is fixed.
50  HALEY, John. The Spirit Of Japanese Law. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006.
TSUJI, Yuichiro. Article 9 and the History of Japan’s Judiciary: Examining Its Likeness to American and German 
Courts. Tsukuba Journal of Law and Politics, Tsukuba, vol. 68, p. 35-78, oct. 2016.
51  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.12 (Japan).
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Second, the ballot papers received by each candidate are counted. The candi-
date name list is then prepared and ordered according to those who obtain the most 
votes. It is not prepared beforehand. The allocation follows the d’Hondt formula.52 
 It has been controversial whether the House of Councillors is regionally re-
presentative. The drafting history of the Japanese Constitution does not show clear 
evidence of efforts to have Japanese regional differences reflected in the House of 
Councillors.
Koji Sato is concerned53 about the extensive influence of the House of Coun-
cillors in parliament; the Houses of the Diet are controlled by opposing parties (Nejire 
Kokkai ). In the Japanese parliamentary system, the prime minister is selected from the 
House of Representatives after dissolution. When the majority of the members of the 
House of Councillors are from opposite parties, the prime minister must uphold public 
commitments. He emphasizes effective management of the Conference Committee of 
both Houses (Ryouin Kyougi Kai ).54
Sato explains that the core of the parliamentary system varies from time to time 
and country to country, and the constituent body shall be centralized in the Japanese 
parliamentary system; the parliament and cabinet seek support from the constituent 
body under the people’s sovereignty.55
Kazuyuki Takahashi explains that the single constituency system expects two 
large political parties in the Diet; the Diet and the cabinet are equally in conflict with 
each other, as the parliamentary motion of non-confidence against the cabinet and 
the dissolution of the House of Representatives by the cabinet leave no reservation. In 
addition, parliament and the cabinet engage the will of the voters. Both parliament and 
the cabinet have the “weapons” to destroy each other in general elections. In the worst 
scenario, both reflect the voters’ will.56 
Toshiyuki Munesue explains two characteristics of the Japanese parliamentary 
system. One is that the House of Representatives is in equal conflict with the cabinet 
as an Article 7 dissolution asks for the voter’s judgment in general elections; and the 
House of Representatives review “conducts affairs of state” and shape higher policies 
52  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art. 86(3) (Japan).
53  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 439-444.
54  Kokkai Hou [The Diet Act] Law No. 86 of 2014, Art 83(2)- (Japan).
55  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 439.475-479.
56  TAKAHASHI, Kazyuki. Rikkenshugi To Nihonkokukenpo [Constitutionalism and the Constitution of 
Japan] Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2013.; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki. Contemporary Democracy in a Parliamentary System. 
In: LUNEY, Percy; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki (Eds.). Japanese Constitutional Law. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 
1993. He focuses on party behavior in parliamentary system. NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKA-
HASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitution II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012.
TAKAHASHI, Kazyuki. Rikkenshugi To Nihonkokukenpo [Constitutionalism and the Constitution of Japan] 
Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2013. p. 172-173.
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by the cabinet in Article 73(1).57 Second, the House of Councillors should seek cabinet 
accountability for the “faithful administration of law” in Article 73(1), and cooperate and 
work together with the cabinet.58 
3.4.  Reform of the House of Councillors
The current electoral system was adopted in 1982 and 1994 by the amended Po-
litical Officer Election Act. From 1947 to 1982, the election for the House of Councillors 
has utilized a national constituency electoral system (Zenkoku Ku) in all territories of 
Japan as one electoral zone for 100 members. Its purpose was once explained in 1947 
that occupational ability must be reflected.59 
Japanese Constitutional scholars explain that a candidate can become a repre-
sentative of the territories of Japan60 once he or she has been chosen under Article 43 
of the Japanese Constitution. Campaign spending by candidates for the House of Cou-
ncillors under the system of Zenkoku Ku was excessive and criticized.61
The Constitutional Research Committee (Kenpo Chousa Kai), established in 1956, 
argued that the two Houses of the Diet should be maintained and the character and 
organization of the House of Councillors was discussed. Since 1946, private committees 
have submitted advisory opinions to the cabinet.
Originally, the members of the House of Councillors were expected to be spe-
cialists such as university professors or vocational representatives. The House of Cou-
ncillors used to be the House of Lords under the Meiji Constitution. Under the new 
Japanese Constitution, labor unions, religious organizations, and interest groups could 
send candidates with huge financial backing, and celebrities had an advantage even 
though their representatives were sparse and living remotely. Regional and vocational 
representatives in the House of Councillors are now decreasing due to political party 
domination. 
In this election, 50 members were selected to be representatives. This system 
adopted the single, non-transferable vote in which voters could write only the name of 
a single candidate. Extra votes were wasted. 
57  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.73(1). Article 73. The Cabinet, in addition to other gener-
al administrative functions, shall perform the following functions: administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs 
of state.
58  Toshiyuki Munesue, Niin Sei no Igi narabini Sangiin no dokujisei [Meaning of bicameral system and unique-
ness of the House of Councillors], Reference 1- 19 (2015 April).
59  In drafting history, Tetsu Katayama, leader of the Japanese Socialist Party, which drafted its own Japanese 
Constitution, noted the House of Councillors aims to reflect occupations.
60  NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, rep-
resentative of all the people.
61  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012.
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From 1983 to 1988, the House of Councillors started using proportional repre-
sentation with a fixed name list (Kousoku Siki Hirei Daihyo). This changed into a non-
fixed list (Hi-Kousoku Meibo) beginning with the 2001 election. The number of seats 
was changed in 1994, 2000, 2006, and 2015 by amending the Public Officer Election 
Act.62
For the 2016 election of the House of Councillors, two seats in Shimane and two 
seats in Tottori were combined and reduced to just two seats for the single district of 
Shimane and Tottori prefectures. Two seats in Tokushima and two seats in Kochi were 
combined and reduced to just two seats as one district of Tokushima and Kochi prefec-
tures. Hokkaido, Tokyo, Aichi, Hyogo, and Fukuoka prefectures increased by two seats 
each. Miyagi, Niigata, and Nagano prefectures decreased by two seats each. Two seats 
were also removed from Niigata, Miyagi, and Nagano prefectures.63
The Conference of Reforming the House of Councillors (Sangiin Kaikaku Kyogi-
kai) has discussed reform of the electoral system since 2005. One of several proposals 
advocated reform of the Electoral District System (Senkyoku-Senkyo) in 2005. Its purpo-
se was to prevent voting disparity four times. The Diet did not agree, and accepted an 
alternative proposal, which advocates four plus four minus seats.
4. MAJOR DECISIONS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
4.1.   Japanese judicial review and elections
The Japanese Constitution has one chapter related to the judiciary, and clearly 
provides judicial review in Article 8164 of the Constitution. Japanese judicial review is a 
substantive judicial review, which is exercised in all legal disputes, not an abstract re-
view without disputes in matters of law. The requirement is provided in Article 3 of the 
Court Act.65 A plaintiff needs to prove the injury was in fact caused by the defendant, 
and is saved by the remedy of the court. This is called subjective litigation (Shukan So-
shou).66 The validity of an election is not within the jurisdiction of subjective litigation 
because generalized grievances do not provide standing at the court.
 The Japanese Constitution allows some exceptional litigation called objective 
litigation (Kyakkan Soshou) that does not require standing.67 The purpose of objective 
62  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.4 (Japan).
63  Id. Art. 5-3 to 6.
64  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.81.
65  Saibansho hou [The Court Act], Law No. 48 of 2013. (Japan), Art.3(1). Courts shall, except as specifically pro-
vided for in the Constitution of Japan, decide all legal disputes, and have such other powers as are specifically 
provided for by law.
66  Gyousei Jiken Soshou Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 59 of 2015, Art. 8, 9, 39 (Japan). 
67  Id. Art. 42.
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litigation is to prevent illegal activity of the administrative agency and ensure that the 
administrative agency conforms to the law.68 In Japan, people’s litigation (Minshu So-
shou, citizen action) 69 and litigation between agencies by statutes (Kikan Soshou, in-
teragency action) fall under Article 5 and 6 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, 
Gyousei Jiken Soshou Hou.70 The people’s litigation includes residential litigation (Jumin 
Soshou)71 and electoral litigation (Senkyo Soshou). 72 
The Public Officer Election Act allows voters to bring suit over the validity of the 
election. A voter may bring suit to contest the validity of the election, which is provided 
in the Public Officer Election Act. 
The purpose of this litigation is for the judiciary to intervene and correct the 
dysfunctional channel between the Diet and the people, and to protect voting rights 
under Articles 14 and 44 of the Japanese Constitution. The election sends the voter’s 
message to the Diet.73 The Supreme Court has held as unconstitutional the allocation of 
the number of members in the two Houses of the Diet several times.
4.2.  The 2009, 2012, and 2014 decisions for the House of Councillors 
In the 2009 decision74 concerning the election of 2007 in relation to disparity in 
the House of Councillors, however, the Supreme Court accepted a 4.86 disparity.
In 2014, the Supreme Court held75 that the election for the House of Councillors 
in July 2013 was unconstitutional (Iken-Jotai). In the July 2013 election, the disparity 
was 4.77 times between Hokkaido and Shimane prefectures in the Electoral District 
System (Senkyoku-Senkyo). The 2014 Supreme Court held that it was a remarkably une-
qual condition. 
68  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 276, 296. NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; 
TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitution II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012; SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. To-
kyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 585,587.
69  Gyousei Jiken Soshou Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 59 of 2015, Art. 5 (Japan). The term 
‘citizen action’ as used in this Act means an action seeking correction of an act conducted by an agency of the 
State or of a public entity which does not conform to laws, regulations, and rules, which is filed by a person 
based on his/her status as a voter or any other status that is irrelevant to his/her legal interest.
70  Id. Art. 5, 6.
71  Chihou Jichi hou [Local Autonomy Act], Law No.67 of 1947, Art.242-2.
72  Koshoku senkyo hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.203, 204, 207, 211(Ja-
pan).
73  SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 339.
74  Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Sep. 30, 2009, Heisei 20 (gyo tsu) 209, 63(7) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 
[Minshu] 1520 (2009).
In this case, Justice Tokiyasu Fujita wrote concurring opinion which reasonable time limit should not be used 
for excuse for legislative inaction. 
TOKIYASU FUJITA, SAIKOUSAI KAISOUROKU [Memory of the Supreme Court ] 301-306 (Yuhikaku 2012).
75  Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct.] Nov. 26, 2014, Heisei 26 (gyo tsu) 155, 68(9) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 
[Minshu] 1363 (2014).
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In the 2014 decision, only nine months after the prior election and the Diet dis-
cussions on reforming of electoral districts, the Supreme Court avoided declaring the 
system unconstitutionally null and void. The 2014 decision warned that the electoral 
district system based on prefectures should be revised, and expected the Diet to imple-
ment immediate reform. The Supreme Court advised the Diet to consider integrating a 
revised plan for reform.
In 2012, the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional the electoral conditions 
of the House of Councillors in July 2010. The disparity was 5.0 times at the time of the 
election. The Supreme Court repeated Iken-Jotai twice in the two most recent elections 
for the House of Councillors, so that the 2012 and 2014 decisions encouraged reform 
of electoral system.
The text of the Japanese Constitution does not outline anything regarding the 
character of the House of Councillors in terms of the regional or prefectural represen-
tativeness of its members. The 2012 decision failed to properly represent regional pre-
fectures, noting the population concentration in large cities and the large disparity in 
population was increasing; moreover, in an electoral district system based on regions 
or prefectures it is difficult to achieve voting equality.
Before the Diet revised the Public Officer Election Act, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party (Minshu)76, the largest opposing parties, insis-
ted that the regional representative system in the House of Councillors should be 
maintained. The Komeito Party and Ishin Party argued that electoral districts based 
on prefectures should be abolished, and regional districts should be newly esta-
blished. These discussions point to the advantage of the electoral strategy of larger 
political parties.
4.3.  The 2011, 2013, and 2015 decisions for the House of Representa-
tives 
In March 2011, the Supreme Court held that the 2009 election of the House of 
Representatives was unconstitutional, using Iken-Jotai. In the 2009 election, the dispari-
ty was a maximum of 2.30 in the election of a single-seat constituency system. In 2009, 
the LDP lost seats in the election of the House of Representatives, and the Democratic 
Party came to power. The 2011 decision considered 17 months after the Public Officer 
Elections Act was revised, and the advisory committee reviewed the electoral system, 
using the Iken-Jotai doctrine.
The 2011 decision was declared in order to keep the system called “Hitori Bet-
suwaku Housiki,” meaning one representative per prefecture regardless of its population. 
76  The Democratic party was dissolved in 2016, and the Minshin Tou (The Democratic Party) was established.
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Since there are 300 single-seat constituencies in the House of Representatives, in this 
system, one representative is given to 47 prefectures, then 253 representatives are allo-
cated as long as the disparity does not exceed 2.0 times. At that time, the total seats of 
the House of Representatives was 480.
The purpose of this system is to provide representatives to prefectures with 
small populations. This makes it more difficult for the legislature to dissolve disparity. 
For example, the population of Tottori prefecture is very small, but one seat was given. 
Tottori kept two seats by the Hitori Betsuwaku system.
In this 2011 decision, Justice Yuki Furuta noted the importance of regional opi-
nion in the development of the country. Hitori Betsuwaku maintained reasonableness, 
and as compared with the precedent, the disparity in this case was still constitutional. 
According to Furuta, a reasonable time limit did not pass.
Justice Mutsuo Tabara wrote a dissenting opinion. He regarded Hitori Betsuwaku 
as unconstitutional because it did not reflect the voice and opinion of under populated 
areas. Even previous cases questioned the system; the legislature did not embark on 
reconsideration for revision of the electoral system, and a reasonable time limit had 
passed. 
 Justice Koji Miyagawa also wrote a dissenting opinion, and criticized Hitori 
Betsuwaku, which led to a disparity, and did not reflect the opinion of under popula-
ted regions. The decision should have been declared as an illegality of the election. 
If the Diet did not abolish it rapidly, the judiciary might declare future elections as 
unconstitutional. 
After the 2011 decision, five seats of the House of Representatives were reduced 
by an amendment of the Public Officer Election Act from 480 to 475. Five prefectures, 
Yamanashi, Fukui, Tokushima, Kochi, and Saga prefectures, were reduced by one seat to 
create single-seat constituencies. 
In the meantime, in 2012 the House of Councillors removed four seats and ad-
ded four others. Fukushima and Gifu prefectures lost two seats, while Osaka and Kana-
gawa prefectures received two seats. The total number of seats is still 242.
The district-fixing council submitted advice for this reform.77 Political compromi-
se distorted its proposal. Originally, the council advised 21 reductions and 21 increases 
in the House of Representatives, but only a five-seat reduction plan was achieved. This 
reform did not take place in time for the December 2012 election of the House of Repre-
sentatives, which Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda dissolved by Article 7.
In November 2013, the Supreme Court announced as unconstitutional condi-
tion or situation in the election of 2012. Its disparity was 2.42. In December 2012, Prime 
77  Shugiin Giin Senkyoku Kakutei Singikai Secchi Hou [The Act for Electoral District-Fixing Committee for the 
House of Representatives], Law No. 95 of 2012, Art.5 (Japan). When the council advises the prime minister, it 
shall report to the Diet.
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Minister Yoshihiko Noda dissolved the House of Representatives by Article 7 immedia-
tely following discussion with Shinzo Abe, the head of the LDP. Shinzo Abe and Yoshihi-
ko Noda agreed to reform the electoral districts after the election in December 2012. 
This was the issue that the Abe administration faced in the 2016 Diet. The 2013 decision 
did not declare the election as unconstitutional, but noted a small reservation. The le-
gislature is obligated to follow the Supreme Court declaration as an unconstitutional 
state or condition. 
In the 2015 decision for the 2014 election of the House of Representatives, the 
disparity was 2.12 times. One of the high courts declared this as unconstitutionally ille-
gal,78 and some high courts announced an unconstitutional state in March 2015.79 The 
Supreme Court was asked to decide on a uniform decision for inferior courts. 
In the 2015 decision, attorneys in favor of electoral reform argued that the ma-
jority decision under a distorted parliamentary electoral system is not the people’s de-
cision, and seats should be allocated by population exactly. The election management 
committee argued that designing an electoral system is under legislative discretion. 
The 2015 decision avoided a clear unconstitutional announcement. Hitori Bet-
suwaku was abolished, and the five seats were reduced from 480 to 475. Following the 
national census, disparity should be under two times. The 2015 Court explained that 
even though the Diet removed five seats, in thirteen electoral districts disparity is over 
two times. It was thus still an unconstitutional state. The Court noted that following the 
2011 decision for election of the House of Representatives in 2009, the legislature made 
some efforts. Only 17 months after the amendment of the Public Officer Election Act for 
a five-seat reduction, the reasonable time limit did not pass for legislature to correct it.
The revised, 2016 Public Officer Election Act will reduce the number of members 
in the House of Representatives from 475 to 465 in 2017. This reform confronted strong 
objection from members chosen from under populated regions where conservative 
parties have traditionally been supported. Political parties are influential in ushering in 
reform by overcoming internal opposition. The next challenge will be who will be the 
official candidate in the electoral district endorsed by major political parties. Despite 
these reforms, Hitori Betsuwaku will remain in part. By Adam’s method, electoral regions 
will get at least one seat no matter how small the population is, due to a function of 
rounding up digits after the decimal point to form an integer.
78  Hiroshima Koto Saibansho, Okayama branch [Hiroshima High Ct.] March 26, 2013, Heisei 24(Gyo ke) No.6, 
D1-Law.com no.28214274.
Nagoya Koto Saibansho, Kanazawa branch [Nagoya High Ct.] March 18, 2015, Heisei 24 (Gyo ke) No.1, D1-Law.
com no. 28210933.
79  Fukuoka Koto Saibansho, Naha branch [Fukuoka High Ct.] March 26, 2015, Heisei 24(Gyo ke) No.1, D1-Law.
com no. 28220585.
Tokyo Koto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] March 6, 2015, Heisei 24 (wa) No.21, 2184 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 3.
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5. THE REPRESENTATIVE AND THE VOTERS 
5.1.  The mission of the representative
Under Article 4380 of the Japanese Constitution, members of the Diet are “the 
representatives of all the people,” not simply the representatives of their own elec-
toral zones. Constitutionalism requires that the ruler and the ruled must match, and 
deliberation of the Diet must reflect the voices of minorities who are far removed 
from politics.81 
Under the Meiji Constitution, the relationship between the voter and the repre-
sentative was considered to be similar to a legal agent of the Civil Code, under which 
the representative reflected the voices of people with mental disabilities.82 This opin-
ion was criticized, as such people were regarded as defective or imperfect. During a 
democratic movement under the Meiji Constitution, called the Taisho democracy, some 
Constitutional scholars maintained that the purpose of the Imperial Parliament was to 
act as an agent of the people. The Supreme ruler was not the people, but the Emperor 
under the Meiji Constitution. The Meiji government banned some books and theories 
of Constitutional law scholars.83
Isao Sato explained that political representatives, following the notion provided 
by the 1791 French Constitution, were not legally bound by the voters. This idea reflected 
the ideas of the French Revolution, and is criticized as elitism.84
Nobuyoshi Ashibe85 modified Isao Sato’s idea. We, the people, work through po-
litical representatives, not legally, and such institutions politically reflect the will of the 
people. The representative works to consolidate various people’s opinions. The opin-
ions of the ruler and the ruled, the people and the Diet, the voter and representative, 
collide in some cases. 
Ashibe analyzed that in political representative systems, the people work 
through their representatives. The electoral body reflects the will of the people; the 
80  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.43.
81  ASHIBE, Nobuyoshi. Kenpo [Constitution]. 6. ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015. p. 42-43; 292-294.
82  TATSUKICHI, Minobe. Kenpo Teiyou [Constitution]. 5. ed. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1932; SOUICHI, Sasaki. Nihon 
Kenpou Youron [The main theory of Constitution]. 3. ed. [s.l.]: Kanasashi Houryudou, 1933.
83  The most famous case was prohibition of a book written by professor Minobe Tatsukichi at Tokyo University 
in 1935. He resigned a member of the House of Peers.
84  SATO, Isao. Pokeet Kenpo [Pocket Constitution]. vol. 1. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1983. p. 14-15; SATO, Isao. Pokeet 
Kenpo [Pocket Constitution]. vol. 2. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1984. p. 683; NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; 
TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitution II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 56.
85  ASHIBE, Nobuyoshi. Kenpo to Gikaisei [Constitution and Parliamentary system]. Tokyo: Tokyo Universi-
ty Press, 1971
NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitution 
II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012
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representative pluralistically combines the wills of the people. The opinion between 
the people and the legislature, the voter and the representative, and the ruler and the 
ruled usually conflict. The political representative sees the political process as a dynam-
ic communication between the voters and the electoral body. The political representa-
tive understands that his work is based on his own beliefs, which nevertheless sounds 
elitist. In some cases, the will of the voter and that of the representative might success-
fully match.
Sociological representatives are similar to political representatives in that a so-
ciological representative is independent of the will of the voters and the collective will 
of society, and social forces balance to be reflected accurately in the legislature.
 Semi-representatives developed in France imported by Japanese Constitutio-
nal researchers86 believe that it is better to reflect people’s opinions in politics, which 
relates directly to democracy. It overlaps with sociological representation.
 Influenced by French Constitutional studies, some Japanese Constitutional re-
searchers understand the Japanese Constitution as a representation of “people power,” 
as in the 1794 French Constitution. Some people approve the mandat impératif, the 
modification of the privilege of exemption from liability, and demand a recall system 
for representatives in the Japanese Constitution.
5.2.  Political party control and discipline
The term “political party” was not included in the Japanese Constitution. The 
political party was protected under freedom of association stipulated in Article 21 of 
the Constitution. According to a classification made by Professor Heinrich Triepel, Ja-
panese Constitutional scholars explain that the Japanese Constitution takes the third 
stage, legalization and control by statute, not having yet reached the fourth stage of 
constitutionalization.
 The political party receives subsidies under the Political Party Funding Law (Sei-
to Josei Hou). A political party comprising more than five members of the Diet is eligible 
to receive subsidies. Its resources are derived from taxes paid by the population based 
on the national census multiplying one politician by 250 yen.87 The subsidy is subject to 
the number of members in a political party. The power of the political parties is stronger 
than individual representatives in terms of political campaigns. Although not written in 
the Japanese Constitution, Japanese scholars explain that representatives make public 
86  Ashibe, supra note 38, at p. 292-294; TSUJIMURA, Miyoko. Simin Shuken no Kanousei [Possibility of cit-
izen sovereignty]. Tokyo: Yushindo, 2002. p. 175-176; TSUJIMURA, Miyoko. Note sur la theone du “mandat 
imperatif”. [s.l.]: Hitotsubashi Kenkyu, 1977. Tsujimura develops people’s sovereignty to citizen one. HIGUCHI, 
Youichi. Hikaku Kenpo [Comparative Constitution] 3. ed. [s.l.]: Seirin Shoin, 1992; TADANO, Masahito. The 
Right to vote and equality of value of vote. [s.l.]: Zenkoku Kenou Kenkyukai, 2015.
87  Seitou Josei Hou [Political Party Funding Law], Law No.69 of 2014, Art.7 (Japan).
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commitments to voters through political parties. Unlike the German Basic Law,88 whi-
ch includes parties in its constitution, the conflict between representatives and parties 
does not occur so often except in the following case.89
A political party may require its members to adhere to party decisions. The re-
presentative selected through proportional representation is chosen under the name 
of their political party. The representative selected shall be the representative of the 
people under Article 43 of Japanese Constitution.90
The Diet Act and the Public Officer Election Act provide that the person selec-
ted by proportional representation in an election of the House of Representatives or 
Councillors, loses his or her seat when he or she changes the political party he or she 
belongs to.91 However, the members elected through the electoral district system do 
not lose seats. Japanese Constitutional scholars question this provision as the will of the 
representative is neglected.92
6. IKEN-JOTAI DOCTRINE IN JAPAN
The Japanese Supreme Court has repeatedly used the Iken-Jotai doctrine since 
the Constitution was established. This doctrine might include several uniform charac-
ters for Constitutional analysis outside Japan. 
6.1.  The beginning of Iken-Jotai in a 1976 decision
In 1976, the Supreme Court held the allocation of the number of members in 
the House of Representatives as unconstitutional.93 This was the beginning of the Iken-
Jotai doctrine.
Equality under the law, Article 14 (1),94 demands the equal value of votes. The 
allocation of members of the Houses of the Diet depends on the discretion of the le-
gislature. As the Diet was beyond the reasonable judgment of equality, taking some 
circumstances into consideration, the Court held this as unconstitutional in 1976. In 
88  Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), Art. 
21(Artikel 21).
89  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 63.
90  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.43.
91  Kokkai hou [The Diet Act] Art. 109-2 (Japan).
Koshoku senkyo hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015. (Japan), Art.99-2 (Japan).
92  NONAKA, Toshihiko; NAKAMURA, Mutsuo; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki; TAKAMI, Katsutoshi. Kenpo II [Constitu-
tion II]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2012. p. 64-66.
93  Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct] April 14, 1976, Showa 49 (gyo tsu) no.75, 30 (3) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 
[Minshu] 223.
94  NIHONKOKU KENPO[KENPO][CONSTITUTION], Art.43.
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this case, the disparity of one to five (1 to 4.99) was unconstitutional under Article 14 of 
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court stated that even though it was unconstitutional, the outco-
me of the election would not be unconstitutional immediately. Exact equality was not 
feasible, and under Article 43 (2) and Article 47, electoral districts, methods of voting, 
and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses 
would be fixed by law. 
The appendix of the Public Officer Election Act provides allocation of the members 
of the Houses, and is inseparable from other provisions, and unconstitutional as a whole.
The factors to be considered included the existing achievement of the election, 
unity as an electoral district, administrative ward of municipalities, size of area, popu-
lation density, resident configuration, transportation conditions, and geographical cir-
cumstances. It would be held unconstitutional if corrective action was not implemen-
ted within “a reasonable period.”
The 1976 Court adopted for the first time the Iken-Jotai condition doctrine ru-
ling by invoking Article 31(1)95 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act in case of action 
for revocation of administrative decision. It is an application by analogy. It is called Jijo 
Hanketsu. The 1976 decision neglected that Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act 
clearly prohibited application of Article 31(1) of the Administrative Case Litigation Act. 
According to the Supreme Court, although Article 31(1) was prohibited from 
applying to the election litigation in Article 219 of the Public Officer Election Act,96 by 
applying the fundamental principle implied in the Administrative Case Litigation Act, 
an unfair election outcome would be avoided.
Statutes ruled as unconstitutional were declared null and void. Members chosen 
by an unconstitutional election were non-members in the beginning. The statutes accor-
ding to which this member joined would be questioned in terms of their effectiveness. 
The existence of members would be subject to public election suits in many districts.
Supremacy provision in Article 98 (2) of the Constitution did not allow this in-
terpretation in cases that had such significant unconstitutional defects. Declaring this 
election unconstitutional did not correct the unconstitutional condition and unsuitable 
outcomes would arise.
95  Gyousei Jiken Soshou Hou [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 59 of 2015 (Japan), Art.31 (Japan). 
In an action for the revocation of an administrative disposition, the court may dismiss a claim with prejudice 
on the merits in cases where the original administrative disposition or administrative disposition on appeal is 
illegal but the revocation thereof is likely to seriously affect public welfare, if the court, having considered the 
extent of any possible damage to be suffered by the plaintiff, the extent and method of compensation for or 
prevention of such damage and all other circumstances concerned, finds that the revocation of the original 
administrative disposition or administrative disposition on appeal is not in line with public welfare. In this case, 
the court shall declare the illegality of the original administrative disposition or administrative disposition on 
appeal in the main text of the judgment of dismissal.
96  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 60 of 2015, Art.219 (Japan).
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In 1985, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the disparity of the members 
of the House of Representatives under Article 14 and 44 of the Constitution. Its disparity 
was 1 to 4.40. Invoking the 1976 decision, the outcome of the election was unconstitu-
tional, but held as valid.
The 1976 and 1985 decisions have raised several important issues. First, the 
1976 and 1985 decisions illustrated several factors for judicial review, such as the exis-
ting achievement of elections, unity as an electoral district, the administrative wards of 
municipalities, sizes of areas, population density, resident configuration, transportation 
conditions, and geographical circumstances. It is not clear which factor was empha-
sized. The Supreme Court left some legislative discretion. The 1976 decision limited 
the wide discretion of the legislature, but later decisions might have endorsed a rather 
wide discretion.97 These decisions illustrate the distress of the judiciary. Its decisions 
are based on the large rural-urban shift of population for economic growth in Japan.98 
Second, the reasonable period is unclear. It encourages the Diet to implement a 
revision of the electoral district. The explanation is so vague that the legislature would 
only make small modifications and reforms, rather than drastic overhauls. 
Committees in the Houses of the Diet act as advisory bodies, with no legal 
binding power over the legislature, which is the sole and “the highest organ of state 
power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State,” under Article 41 of the 
Constitution. 
Third, the representative may feel th e duty to revise electoral districts in line 
with decisions made by the Supreme Court, but the political party is financially strong 
enough to influence candidates in campaigns, and the party may force its members to 
follow the party’s decisions. The party may change its platform after an election, and 
some representatives may believe that this is a betrayal to voters. 
Fourth, the existing electoral system works to the advantage of incumbents.99
Fifth, the prime minister’s leadership advances reform of the electoral district. 
The leadership of the prime minister who is also head of the ruling party is strong. The 
national census is taken every 10 years,100 and the district-fixing council of the House of 
Representatives uses this data.101 Usually a revision of the number of members is based 
on its data. 
97  WATANABE, Yasuyuki. Rippousha niyoru Seido Keisei to sono Genkai. Hosei kenkyu or Journal of law and 
politics, Fukuoka, vol. 76, n. 3, 2009.
98  MAKI, John. Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Human Rights. In: LUNEY, Percy; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki 
(Eds.). Japanese Constitutional Law. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1993.
99  MATSUI, Shigenori. Kenpo [Constitution of Japan]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2007. p. 53. He focuses on limitation 
if the campaigning.
100  Toukei Hou [Statistics Act], Law No. 53 of 2007, Art.2, 5, 8 (Japan).
101  Shugiin Giin Senkyoku Kakutei Singikai Secchi hou [Law for establishment of electoral district-fixing coun-
cil for the House of Representatives], Law No. 95 of 2012, Art.3 (Japan).
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After the national census in 2000, former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi 
followed a proposal of five plus five minus by the district-fixing council102 of the House 
of Representatives, and submitted to the Diet a revision of the Public Officer Election 
Act. His leadership was effective.
In February 2016, in the budget committee in the House of Representatives, 
Yoshihiko Noda, the former prime minister who lost in the election of 2012, mentio-
ned to Prime Minister Abe that electoral reform was a condition of the dissolution of 
the House of Representatives in December 2012, which Abe has not yet achieved. 
Abe answered that the reform should be achieved by the end of 2016. Several mem-
bers of the LDP opposed Abe’s answer, but his leadership went on for reform. This 
is because in the Japanese parliamentary system, the prime minister has the power 
to appoint a minister under Article 68 of the Constitution. This power will work for 
the prime minister’s leadership unless a strong political faction prevents it inside the 
ruling political party.
Sixth, the district-fixing council is an autonomous third party panel, indepen-
dent of the legislature. The autonomy of this council might be constitutionally required, 
and the Supreme Court may emphasize its constitutional importance in its decision 
before making a declaration of unconstitutionality. The composition of this council may 
lack legitimacy compared to the legislature chosen directly by voters. 
Seventh, equality under Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution requires one to 
less than two disparities. Constitutional scholars believe that the judiciary is required to 
achieve this standard. Inferior courts in Japan have the power of judicial review under 
Article 81 in the National Police Reserve case in 1953.103 Before the 2015 Supreme Court 
decision for voting disparity, some inferior courts rendered disparity as unconstitutio-
nal. The Hiroshima High Court held that its unconstitutional decision would take effect 
after a certain time. Usually unconstitutional decisions are retroactive. The Hiroshima 
High Court limited the scope of the unconstitutional decision in time base.104
The Supreme Court has a duty to render uniform decisions by examining infe-
rior court decisions. Frustrated decisions by inferior courts might induce the Supreme 
Court to be more positive these days. By emphasizing the autonomy of the council to fix 
electoral districts in judiciary decisions, the Supreme Court still has room to encourage 
legislative movement. Otherwise, it may declare legislative decisions unconstitutional.
Lastly, the 1976 decision based on reform of the House of Councillors was not 
enacted in 1982 nor 1994.Thus, the scope of the 1976 decision was narrow. 
102  Five plus and five minus, and reformed 68 electoral districts in 20 prefectures. 
103  Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct] Oct.8, 1952, Showa 27 (ma) no.23, 6 (9) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Mins-
hu]783.
104  Hiroshima Koto Saibansho [Hiroshima High Ct.] March 25, 2013, Heisei 24 (Gyo ke) no. 4, 2185 HANREIJI-
HOU [HANJI] 36.
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6.2.  The 2005 decision for voting rights outside of Japan 
One of the obstacles for an unconstitutional decision for voting disparity is le-
gislative discretion to amend electoral districts through statutes. The council advice has 
no legal force. Emphasizing the value of voting rights over the electoral system or insti-
tution by legislature means that basic principles of voting rights may tighten legislative 
discretion.
The Supreme Court admitted that voting rights are limited as long as it is neces-
sary to achieve fairness in elections. In the case that the right to vote is an issue for sub-
jective litigation (Shukan Soshou), the judiciary may narrow legislative discretion. In the 
case of disparity in voting rights in objective litigation (Kyakkan Soshou), the judiciary 
will wait for the legislature to work.
The 2005 Supreme Court decision105 did not use the term legislative discretion. 
Before the 2005 decision, the Public Officer Election Act106 completely precluded Japa-
nese citizens who were residing abroad with no address in any area of a municipality in 
Japan from voting in national elections at the time of the general election for members 
of the House of Representatives held on October 20, 1996. Japanese people brought 
suit against the government according to the State Redress Act (Kokka Baishou Hou) .107
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that ex-Article 21(2) and Article 8 of the Su-
pplementary Provisions of the Public Officer Election Act was in violation of Article 
15(1) and (3), Article 43(1), and Article 44 of the Constitution for the reason that “limits, 
for the time being, the applicability of the system for allowing Japanese citizens who 
were residing abroad and had no address in any area of a municipality in Japan to vote 
in national elections of Diet members under the proportional representation system 
will, at least at the time of the first general election of members of the House of Repre-
sentatives or regular election of members of the House of Councillors to be held after 
this judgment is handed down, be in violation of Article 15(1) and (3), Article 43(1), and 
the proviso of Article 44 of the Constitution.”108
 This 2005 decision allowed legal suit to seek declaration on legal relations under 
public law that “Japanese citizens who are residing abroad and have no address in any 
area of a municipality in Japan are eligible to vote in an election of members under the 
single-seat constituency system in the next general election of members of the House 
of Representatives and in an election of members under the constituency system in the 
105  Saiko Saibansho [Sup.Ct] September 14, 2005, Heisei 13 (Gyo tsu) no.82, 83, (Gyo Hi) no.76, 77, 59(7) Saiko 
Saibansho Minji Hanreishu [Minshu] 2087.
106  Koshoku Senkyo Hou [Japanese Public Officer Election Act], Law No. 47 of 1998, Art.21(2), 42, 8 of the sup-
plementary provisions (Japan). 
107  Kokka Baishou Hou [The State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of October 27, 1947, Art.1 (Japan).
108  supra note 104.
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next regular election of members of the House of Councillors on the grounds that they 
are listed on the overseas electoral register.”109
The 2005 decision shows the following reservations for disparity cases. First, vo-
ting rights and disparity are based on different articles of the Constitution. For disparity 
cases and the equal protection provision, Articles 14 and 44 of the Japanese Constitu-
tion arose. In the 2005 decision, the Court applied Article 15(1), 15(3), and 43(1) of the 
Constitution. Disputes regarding equality principles do not always end in rights-based 
litigation. One explanation is that equality of voting rights is peripheral in Article 14 of 
the Constitution, and is subject to wider legislative discretion, and rational review may 
work.110 The basic principle of voting rights binds legislative discretion.
Second, these cases had different types of litigations. For disparity cases, the 
objective litigation (Kyakkan Soshou) legislatively afforded a party to bring suit. For the 
2005 case, the Japanese citizens bought suit to seek damages. The promising point in 
the 2005 decision is that the Supreme Court held the government liable, and was asked 
to amend the Public Officer Election Act to extend voting rights to Japanese citizens 
living abroad. The Japanese Supreme Court rarely admits inaction of the legislature to 
pass the statutes, as the legislature is the highest organ to pass law under Article 41 of 
the Constitution.111 The 2005 decision focused on more than 10 years. In the disparity 
case, the reasonable time limit did not show a specific period. 
Third, the dissenting opinions of Justice Tokuji Izumi in the 2007 decision for 
political campaign activity in elections for the House of Representatives in 2005 and 
the 2015 decision regarding the Political Official Election Act were helpful to limit legis-
lative discretion.112 He attempted to explain the 2007 constitutional decision that held 
the limitation of political campaign for electing the House of Representatives in 2005 
as unconstitutional. 
In the 2015 decision regarding the Political Official Election Act limiting Japa-
nese citizen living abroad, Justice Tokuji dissented with the majority, which admitted 
damage under the State Redress Act.113 Emotional distress is not appropriate for mo-
netary damage in voting disparity cases. When voting rights of Japanese citizens are 
109  supra note 104.. 
110  SHISHIDO, Joji. Kenpo Kaishaku Ron No Ouyou To Tenkai [Development and application of theory of 
constitutional interpretation]. 2. ed. Tokyo: Nihonhyouronsha, 2014.
111  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] November 21, 1985, Showa 53 (o) No.1240, 39(7) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanreishu 
[Minshu] 1512 (Japan). SATO, Koji. Kenpo [Constitution]. Tokyo: Seibundo, 2011. p. 636-638.
112  Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct] June 13, 2007, Heisei 18(gyo tsu) No.176, 61(4) Saiko Saibansho Minji Hanrei-
shu [Minshu] 1617 (Japan). (Tokuji Izumi, J., dissenting). TOKUJI, Izumi. Watashi No Saikousaibansho Ron 
[My perspective on the Supreme Court]. [s.l.]: Nihonhyouronsha, 2013. See also, TOMATSU, Hidenori. Equal 
Protection of the Law. In: LUNEY, Percy; TAKAHASHI, Kazuyuki (Eds.). Japanese Constitutional Law. Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 1993. He argues that by using Iken Jotai doctrine of the Supreme Court led confusion 
in the high court decisions. MATSUI, Shigenori. Kenpo [Constitution of Japan]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2007. p. 44.
113  Kokka Baishou Hou [The State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of October 27, 1947, Art.1 (Japan).
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indiscriminately infringed upon, the judiciary must provide a remedy to correct and 
restore operation of the democratic political process as much as possible. 
The litigation for the State Redress Act in this case was supplementary, and the 
plaintiff Japanese citizens sought the judiciary to recognize the statute as unconstitu-
tional in its reasoning, and encourage the legislature indirectly to restore voting rights. 
In this case, the plaintiffs were concerned that the primary litigation might be denied, 
and included the additional argument of the State Redress Act. Nominal damage is not 
provided in the Japanese State Redress Act; thus, its argument is inappropriate. If the 
court accepts monetary claims in this case, the judiciary must accept monetary claims 
in disparity cases in the future. 
In disparity of electoral districts, Article 204 of the Public Office Election Act pro-
vides litigation and remedy for voters. Thus, in this case, the plaintiff did not have to 
bring a damage claim under the State Redress Act if the judiciary accepted claims. The 
judiciary shall engage with legislative inaction for voting rights causing discrimination. 
If the judiciary accepts monetary claims, the damages would spread and the burden on 
taxpayers would increase. Free from this anxiety, the judiciary must correct the dispa-
rity of voting rights.
6.3.  The 2015 reform and the Supreme Court decision
The Supreme Court has announced the Iken-Jotai decision every year since 2011 
in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. 
In 2015, the district-fixing council in the House of the Representatives proposed 
to use Adams’ system to allocate members. With the exception of the Socialist (Shamin) 
and Communist parties (Kyosan), the opposite parties accepted its advisory opinion of 
removing ten seats from the House of Representatives. The number of the members of 
the House of the Representatives will be from 475 to 465. 
In a discussion between Prime Minister Abe and former Prime Minister Noda 
in the budget committee in 2016, Abe insisted that rapid reform would be achieved 
under Adams’ approach by the 2020 national census during the 2016 session. Abe told 
the Secretary General of the LDP, Sadaguchi Tanigaki114, to make proposals within the 
LDP. It has been difficult to build consensus within the LDP as it represents a majority 
party in the Diet.
 In February 2016, the LDP proposed three plans. First, under the 2015 simple 
national census, a six-seat will be reduced in single-seat constituencies, and a four-seat 
reduced in proportionally represented. Second, reform of the electoral district will start 
114  Taniguchi got injured by bicycle, and resigned post of the Secretary‐General of the Liberal‐Democratic 
Party in 2016.
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after the 2020 formal national census. Detailed measures for reduction were not men-
tioned in this proposal.115
These proposals show that the ruling party impedes reform of the electoral dis-
tricts since the ruling party has the highest number of incumbent members. The Supre-
me Court decision seeking abolishment of Hitori Betsuwaku has not come to fruition, 
as its proposal does not coordinate prefectural disparity. Adams’ approach met with 
strong opposition.
In 2016, the Public Officer Election Act was revised to reduce the number of the 
members from 475 to 465, reduced the number of single-seat constituencies from 295 
to 289, and reduced the number of proportionally represented, multiple-seat consti-
tuencies by 4 (Hirei Daihyo). These changes will come into effect in 2017. 
The new Adams’ method will be adopted from the 2020 national census 
onwards. It aims to increase members of the House of Representatives in large cities, 
and decrease them in under populated areas. The national census may require 9 incre-
ases in the single-seat constituencies, and 15 decreases in the proportionally represen-
ted, multiple-seat constituencies.
Prime Minister Abe is currently considering amending the Japanese Constitu-
tion. The election of the House of Councillors in July 2015 targeted the issue of Japa-
nese Constitutional amendment. Disparity between the Houses of the Diet remain an 
important concern for Japanese Constitutional law scholars.
7. CONCLUSION
After the Meiji Constitution was amended, the electoral constituencies re-
mained the same. Dialogue between the GHQ and the Japanese government conclud-
ed to abolish the House of Lords and privileges of the peers under Article 14 of new 
Constitution. In spite of a lack history of a federal system, the House of Councillors was 
established with the intention to limit the power of the lower house. The role of the 
House of Councillors and the difference between these two Houses were not clearly 
stipulated in the Japanese Constitution. The Public Officer Election Act provides the 
details of the electoral system. The Constitution stipulates one vote per person, which 
was intended to fix the voting disparity.
The Tomabechi decision shows that under the parliamentary system of the new 
Constitution, the cabinet has the power to dissolve the House of Representatives with 
Article 7, regarding the Emperor’s ritual conduct.
This decision used the political question theory, which is criticized by con-
stitutional researchers. Even though political question theory might be intrinsic to 
115  Jimin to Minshin Shuin Senkyo Seido Houan wo sorezore Teishutu [LDP and Minshin party submitted bill 
for reform of election of the House of Representatives], NHK News Web (April 15, 2016). 
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democracy, in that voters should be the judges of the cabinet and parliament, the 
scope and conditions should be clear. In the case of the dissolution of the House of 
Representatives, unlike the Sunagawa decision, the autonomy and discretion of the 
cabinet should have been considered. 
There should be some clear conditions that stipulate when the dissolution of 
the House of Representatives is necessary, such as important bills being shelved, fun-
damental changes occurring in the cabinet, etc. Moreover, whether dissolution of the 
cabinet can be approved by voters via election is another matter in the Japanese Con-
stitution that needs to be clarified.
There have been several electoral reforms made under the Japanese Constitu-
tion. Under the Japanese Constitution, judicial review is concrete, not abstract. Howev-
er, the litigation for voting disparity is an exception that the Public Officer Election Act 
allows to stand.
The Constitution requires the government to fix the voting disparity. In Japan, 
the two Houses of the Diet have introduced their own reform.
It is very unique to review the technique of Iken-Jotai, or an “unconstitutional 
state or condition,” which is an obscure doctrine used by the Japanese Supreme Court 
in 1976. It explained that, although an election is valid, it is nevertheless an illegal and 
unconstitutional process as per the equality doctrine of Articles 14 and 44 of the Japa-
nese Constitution. The 1976 decision showed the large movement in Japan from rural 
areas to large cities and tried to limit legislative discretion. 
The Supreme Court has held Iken-Jotai five times since 2009, three times to the 
House of Councillors and two times to House of Representatives. These decisions allow 
legislative discretion to modify the allocation of seats in the Diet. Some reform was 
made, but not thorough because of the strong objection from parliament.
The factors that limit the wide discretion of the legislature were displayed in 
these decisions, but it is not clear which factors are critical, such as the existing achie-
vement of elections, unity as an electoral district, the administrative ward of munici-
palities, the size of an area, population density, resident configuration, transportation 
conditions, and geographical circumstances.
The reasonable time limit for reform should encourage the legislature to make 
drastic reform, not endorse small modifications to preserve incumbent seats. Members 
of the Houses of the Diet may lose electoral regions if reforms are enacted.
The political party is strong enough to enforce some electoral reform becau-
se members can make their public commitment along with their party agenda in the 
Japanese parliament. Emphasis on the political party may enforce party commitment 
among members while sacrificing the unique character of the House of Councillors, the 
purpose of which is not written in the text of the Japanese Constitution. The House of 
Councillors had no political party involvement because its aim used to be regional and 
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vocational representation in the beginning of current constitution. Nowadays, the po-
litical party is the dominant voice in the two Houses of the Diet even though this is not 
clearly written in the Constitution. The political party may disguise its agenda through 
distractions such as tax cuts in its campaign. 
For reform of electoral regions, the prime minister’s leadership would be helpful, 
but its exercise depends on political fighting with opposition parties and even within 
his own party.
In order to understand the Japanese parliamentary system, Sato emphasized 
that the constituency is at the center of the relationship between the cabinet and the 
parliament under the people’s sovereignty. Takahashi viewed the dissolution of the 
House of Representatives as a weapon for the parties to destroy each other. Munasue 
required the House of Councillors to seek accountability from the cabinet. 
Representatives in the Japanese parliament are required to consider minority 
opinion, and deliberate to reflect pluralistic perspectives of the people. The different 
election system aims to achieve this in both Houses of the parliament.
The district-fixing council (Senkyo Kukaku Shingi Iinnkai) for the House of Repre-
sentatives was established under the cabinet office. It is not provided in the Constitu-
tion, and its opinion is advisory, with no binding power; that is to say that its advice 
does not bind the cabinet. The council’s autonomy to fix the electoral district might 
be constitutionally required if the judiciary declares that voting disparity has been un-
constitutionally unequal under unconstitutional conditions or states (Iken-Joutai). The 
judiciary can reflect district council opinion in writing its decisions.
One alternative solution for the judiciary to encourage reform by legislature is 
the rights-based approach mentioned in the 2005 decision. In this case, the Supreme 
Court allowed legal suit seeking declaration of legislative inaction under public law for 
those who live outside of Japan and are unable to vote. Although this decision didn’t 
use the term “legislative discretion,” the basic principle of voting right might bind legis-
lative discretion in voting disparity cases.
Justice Tokuji’s dissenting opinion in the 2007 decision admitted damage under 
the State Redress Act. Emotional distress is not appropriate for monetary damage in 
voting disparity cases. When voting rights of Japanese people are indiscriminately in-
fringed upon, the judiciary must provide a remedy to correct and restore operation of 
the democratic political process as much as possible.
The litigation for the State Redress Act in this case was supplementary, and the 
plaintiff Japanese citizens sought the judiciary to recognize the statute as unconstitu-
tional in its reasoning, and indirectly encourage the legislature to restore voting rights. 
These voting disparity decisions show the core of the parliament, the constitu-
tionality of the dissolution of the House of Representatives, the constitutional control 
for electoral reform, and the relationship among the judiciary, legislature, and cabinet. 
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The rights-based approach might limit the wide discretion of the legislature. The uni-
que roles of the House of Councillors and political parties were not stipulated in the 
Japanese Constitution. These factors are now vital in analyzing the Iken-Jotai doctrine 
in the Japanese Constitution. 
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